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 2 Michael Ehrmann
1 Introduction
Numerous recent publications have been devoted to a theoretical analysis of
the various channels of monetary policy transmission.1 On the empirical side,
the evidence is still far from complete. This paper aims to contribute further
evidence on two channels of monetary policy transmission, namely the balance
sheet and the bank lending channel.
The balance sheet channel is built on the argument that asymmetric infor-
mation in the credit markets necessitates the use of collateral for borrowing.
As a consequence, the availability of credit for ¯rms is dependent on the value
of their assets. If credit market conditions are tightened by rising interest rates,
this will a®ect the balance sheet positions of ¯rms: higher interest payments
reduce cash °ow and higher interest rates lower the market value of assets.
A monetary policy tightening can thus possibly leave ¯rms with a restricted
access to credit. The ¯rms which are more likely to be a®ected by this chan-
nel are small ¯rms: due to higher informational asymmetries, the amount of
collateral they have to pledge is relatively higher. A balance sheet weakening
due to a monetary policy tightening can thus imply that they might become
credit-constrained.
The bank lending channel comes into play if the central bank has leverage
over the volume of intermediated credit in the economy and at least some ¯rms
depend on intermediated credit. If the ¯rst condition holds, a tighter mone-
tary policy decreases the volume of credit available to borrowers. If the second
condition holds, some borrowers cannot substitute intermediated credit with
other forms of ¯nancing and will be left with a restricted access to ¯nance
their investment projects. It is typically assumed that it is easier for large
¯rms to access other, non-intermediated forms of external ¯nance, because
the markets possess more information about these ¯rms. Following monetary
tightening, it is therefore relatively easy for large ¯rms to substitute interme-
diated credit with other funds, whereas small ¯rms are less °exible and hence
face a restricted availability of funds.
Both channels are re°ected in theories of credit market imperfections like
those of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Several
publications like Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) or Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) have provided supportive evidence for the US economy: using
¯rm size as a proxy for capital market access, they do indeed ¯nd that small
¯rms are a®ected more strongly by monetary policy.
The strength of both transmission channels depends on the phase of the
business cycle: theory predicts that both are stronger in a downturn. The
balance sheet channel becomes more potent because net worth of ¯rms falls
in downturns, with a corresponding deterioration of balance sheet positions;
the bank lending channel is strengthened because default probabilities rise in
1For an overview of those channels see Cecchetti (1995).Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 3
a downturn, thus increasing the cost of intermediated credit and starting a
°ight to quality, which restricts small ¯rms even more than in booms.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that, indeed, small ¯rms' reactions to
shocks to the federal funds rate are dependent on the business cycle position.
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) con¯rm that the stock returns of small
¯rms are a®ected more strongly by tightening monetary conditions than those
of large ¯rms and that these e®ects are reinforced if the economy is in a
recession.
Whereas the evidence for the US is generally supportive of these e®ects,
the picture for Germany (and other European countries) is much less clear.
The recent constributions by Kalckreuth (2003) and Chatelain et al. (2003)
conclude that there is some scope for these channels in Germany, but that they
are of secondary importance. By splitting ¯rms according to a rating variable
that measures their credit worthiness, distributional e®ects of monetary policy
can be identi¯ed, whereas the size of ¯rms appears uninformative in this
respect. This is in contrast with Audrestsch and Elston (2002), who ¯nd ¯rm
size to be important. Finally, Siegfried (2000) cannot identify credit channel
e®ects at all in his study.
The data underlying most of the existing studies has two drawbacks. On
the one hand, there is often a compositional bias towards large ¯rms. On the
other hand, annual balance sheet data, which are often available for small
¯rms, do not allow inference at higher frequencies. The present paper exploits
a data set that is not subject to those shortcomings; it includes very small
¯rms (1{49 employees) and is available at a monthly frequency.
A large part of the literature follows Fazzari et al. (1988) by comparing
the sensitivity of investment to cash °ow across ¯rms with di®ering degrees of
informational asymmetries. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Kaplan
and Zingales (2000) argue that such investment-cash °ow sensitivities do not
provide useful measures of ¯nancing constraints. Rather, the reaction need
not be monotonic in the degree of ¯nancial constraints. This can be the case
if the ¯nance premium of a strongly ¯nancially constrained ¯rm reacts less
than for a ¯rm which is relatively less constrained. The approach taken in this
paper di®ers from this indirect testing by comparing cash °ow sensitivities and
thus not prone to the Kaplan and Zingales critique. Although I will follow
the literature and classify ¯rms a priori according to the degree of ¯nancial
constraints (using a size criterion), I will conduct a direct test as to how the
¯rm (namely, its business conditions) is a®ected by monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The data set will
be described in Sect. 2. Section 3 explains the testing strategy applied. The
subsequent Sect. 4 explores whether small ¯rms are a®ected disproportion-
ately by monetary tightenings. Section 5 investigates whether the asymmetry
arises due to demand or supply side factors. In a further step, Sect. 6 checks
for business cycle asymmetries of monetary policy e®ects. Section 7 concludes.4 Michael Ehrmann
2 Data Description
Each month, the German Ifo-Institute for Economic Research conducts a busi-
ness survey among more than 8,000 ¯rms. Of these, approximately 3,000 be-
long to the West German manufacturing industry and form the subsample
used in this paper. Firms are invited to answer questions on their business
and demand conditions in the following ways:
² \At present, we consider our business conditions to be i) good, ii) satis-
factory (usual for the season), iii) bad"
² \Our demand situation, compared to the last month, has i) improved, ii)
remained unchanged, iii) deteriorated"
Boxes are provided next to each answer; the ¯rms have to tick the box
according to their choice. For each question, all answers are aggregated to an
index variable by subtracting the share of \¡"answers (third option) from the
share of \+"answers (¯rst option). The indices can therefore take any value
between +1 and ¡1, with the extreme cases occurring when all ¯rms answer
with \+" or \¡".
The data can be broken down according to ¯rm size, with the classi¯cations
depicted in Tab. 1.
Table 1. Sample Breakdown
Size Class 1 2 3 4 5
Employees 1{49 50{199 200{499 500{999 ¸1,000
% of Sample 16% 33% 23% 13% 15%
The size sorted data are available from July 1981. The latest observation
included in the analysis here is 1998:12, to avoid the problem of a changing
monetary policy regime with the introduction of the euro. As an illustration,
Fig. 1 shows the business conditions for the largest and smallest ¯rms. Ap-
parently, there is quite some variation of the series across size groups.
Tables 2 to 4 provide some descriptive statistics of the series. They all
exhibit a monotonic relationship between the size classes. This monotonicity
will reappear in several results throughout the paper and suggests that size is
an important factor in explaining ¯rm behavior.
Table 2. Mean of Series
Size Class 1 (smallest) 2 3 4 5 (largest)
Business Conditions -.118 -.064 -.048 -.020 -.006
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Table 3. Coe±cient of Variation of Series
Size Class 1 (smallest) 2 3 4 5 (largest)
Business Conditions -141 -323 -425 -1095 -3917
Demand -109 -220 -568 -885 1240
Table 4. Correlation Coe±cients for Di®erent Size Classes
Business Conditions Demand




:90 :95 :98 1
:77 :84 :93 :94 1




:81 :86 :90 1
:74 :79 :87 :87 1
A priori, it is not clear whether data series of this kind are actually suit-
able for an analysis of macroeconomic issues. Firstly, it can be argued that
the access to relevant information di®ers across size classes, thus leading to
di®erent response patterns. Secondly, the series contain only perceptions of
¯rms, rather than \hard" and quanti¯able facts. Nothing guarantees that the
perceptions of ¯rms are, even when aggregated, on average correct. However,
there is evidence that the data are free of such biases.
The business conditions index is used, together with a series on ¯rms' busi-
ness expectations, to construct the \Ifo Business Climate Index", an indicator
which is widely used in German business cycle analysis because of its good
quality as a leading indicator. Indeed, as is shown in Table 6 in the appendix,
the correlations of the data with the business cycle is striking and clearly
shows a leading pattern. Business conditions lead deviations from trend in in-
dustrial production by one quarter, and have a correlation coe±cient of 0.85
for most size classes. The high correlation of all series with the business cy-
cle suggests that they draw a rather accurate picture of the actual business
conditions.
Another potential problem with this data could arise if size were corre-
lated with other features, like e.g. the industry a±liation. In such a case, the
regressions might reveal industry e®ects of monetary policy rather than size
e®ects. Although it might be the case that the size distribution di®ers across
industries, it is comforting to know that most industries cover all size classes.
Exceptions are 6 out of 27 industries, namely the wood industry, which com-
prises size classes 1 to 3 only, car manufacturing (size classes 2 to 5 only),
ceramics (1 to 4), paper (1 to 4), \other production goods" (3 to 5), and
\other consumer goods" (1 to 3). Most of these industries (with the exception
of car manufacturing) have a relatively small share in the aggregate industrial
production.6 Michael Ehrmann
Since the data are aggregated across ¯rms, it is not possible to estimate
the individual ¯rms' thresholds at which they would have changed their as-
sessment of business conditions su±ciently to also change their answer to the
survey. Whereas the series of a single ¯rm follows a step function over time,
changing between the three possible answers, this would only be the case for
the aggregated series if the thresholds were identical across ¯rms. The smooth-
ness of the series reveals that the thresholds are di®erent for the individual
¯rms, however. The aggregated series can therefore not be used to estimate
the threshold value for ¯rms, and whether this depends on ¯rm size, but in-
stead to estimate whether a larger share of small ¯rms experiences a change in
business conditions that leads them to change their assessment in the survey.
In any case, the survey data cannot give an estimate of how strongly a
¯rm is a®ected once it has passed the threshold level. The estimates in this
paper might therefore underestimate the potential asymmetries, if not only
more small ¯rms are led to report a worsening of their conditions, but their
actual conditions also deteriorate by even more than the threshold value.
The data are not only aggregated across ¯rms, but also across the type
of answers, since the share of negative answers is subtracted from the share
of positive answers. In order to analyze whether this a®ects the results, all
regressions have been performed on the share of positive and negative answers
separately, too. All results in the paper are una®ected by this robustness check.






monotonically increasing transformation that maps the data from the [¡1,1]-
interval to [¡1,+1]; a more detailed explanation is provided in appendix
A.1.
3 Testing Strategy
Tests of the balance sheet and bank lending channel need to identify the
reaction of credit supply to a monetary policy shock. In this paper, as in
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), we will employ the heterogeneity of ¯rms to do
so. The underlying assumption, as mentioned in the introduction, is that small
¯rms are more prone to asymmetric information problems and more dependent
on bank loans than large ¯rms. A monetary-policy-induced decrease of credit
supply should therefore lead to a worsening of business conditions that is
larger for small ¯rms than for large ¯rms. The main di±culty, however, is to
ensure that the bank lending channel is the only possible explanation for such
a di®erential reaction.
Gertler and Gilchrist analyse the reaction of sales to a monetary policy
shock. A larger drop of sales in small than in large ¯rms, however could also
be explained by subcontracting: if large ¯rms contract out to small ¯rms when
demand is high, but maintain the whole business in times of weak demand,
then this could also imply a stronger drop of sales for small ¯rms after aFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 7
monetary tightening. Similarly, business conditions for small ¯rms would de-
teriorate by more than those for large ¯rms in such a case. To overcome this
identi¯cation problem, Gertler and Gilchrist analyze the reaction of invento-
ries: if ¯nancial frictions exist, then small ¯rms should face more di±culties
in smoothing production when sales decline and as such should be forced to
shed inventories. In this paper, a di®erent strategy is used. Since ¯rms reveal
their demand situation, the e®ects of subcontracting should be re°ected in
the demand situation of small ¯rms. Once demand is controlled for, any ad-
ditional disproportionate decrease in business conditions cannot be explained
by subcontracting.
A similar identi¯cation problem arises if small ¯rms are concentrated in
cyclical industries. Again, this possibility is accounted for by the demand
variable. Having controlled for demand, the cyclicality of the industry has
been corrected for.
A third issue mentioned by Gertler and Gilchrist could arise if small ¯rms
have more °exible technologies. For their sales and inventories data, this is
potentially interesting, since a more °exible ¯rm can adjust inventories to
movements in sales more quickly. For the business conditions, this is not an
issue, since this scenario would imply that a small ¯rm, with a faster adjust-
ment, reports depressed business conditions for a shorter period only. This ef-
fect would therefore counteract the expected stronger reaction of small ¯rms'
business conditions.
As an additional check, Gertler and Gilchrist suggest testing for asymme-
tries across the business cycle. This approach will be implemented here as
well. The credit constraints should be more important in recessions than in
booms, which would imply that the reaction of small ¯rms' business conditions
is larger during recessions than it is during booms.
Although the Ifo survey contains data on inventories, they will not be
exploited here, because the actual level of inventories, as analyzed in Gertler
and Gilchrist, is conceptually di®erent from the according survey data. In the
survey, ¯rms are asked whether they consider their level of inventories too
small, su±cient, or too big. If a ¯rm accumulates inventories, this can be an
active process because it perceives the present level of inventories as too low,
or because inventories are treated as some sort of residual: with decreasing
demand, a ¯rm might want to smooth production and therefore accumulates
inventories. Although we would see an accumulation of inventories in both
cases, the answers in the business survey would be di®erent.
The next sections will ¯rst estimate whether business conditions show a
di®erential response according to size classes. Subsequently, the control for
demand will be introduced. Eventually, it will be analyzed whether the e®ects
of monetary policy on business conditions di®er across business cycle phases.8 Michael Ehrmann
4 Monetary Policy and Business Conditions
The e®ects of monetary policy will be analyzed with Structural Vector Au-
toregressions (SVARs). In particular, the identi¯cation approach suggested by
King, Plosser, Stock, and Watson (1991) (KPSW) will be employed. In their
framework, monetary policy can be modelled in terms of shocks to cointegra-
tion relations and as such need not be restricted to shocks to single variables.
As a matter of fact, a monetary policy shock will be modelled as a shock
to the interest rate and (with opposite sign) to the money growth rate. A
more detailed discussion of both SVAR models and the KPSW procedure is
provided in appendix A.2
4.1 The Baseline Model
The estimations start with a simple baseline model to understand how busi-
ness conditions of ¯rms are a®ected by monetary policy. Later on, the model
will be extended to investigate the di®erential impact of monetary policy on
¯rms of di®erent size.
The baseline model consists of a four-variate VAR with
Xt = [Dmt bci;t it ¼t]
0 ;
where Xt includes the growth rate of M3 (Dmt), business conditions of size
class i (bci;t), a three month's money market rate (it) and producer price
in°ation (¼t).2 The data are monthly and range from 1981:7 to 1998:12, cov-
ering a sample of 210 observations. Since the aim of this paper is to identify
e®ects over the business cycle, seasonality and long-run trends are eliminated
by the inclusion of seasonal dummies and the use of detrended variables. The
latter is achieved by simply regressing the data on a linear trend. Six lags
are included in the models, which are estimated as Vector Error Correction
models (VECMs) to allow for the possibility of cointegration. Stability tests
on the VARs do not show any signs of structural breaks.
This model is estimated separately for the business conditions of each size
class.3 The cointegration analysis for this baseline model suggests the exis-
tence of cointegration relations (see Table 7 in the appendix). Three possible
relations come to mind: the business conditions should be stationary, because
they form a business cycle indicator and as such should be mean reverting;
2All variables, with the exception of interest rates, are in logarithms (the growth
rates are annualized di®erences of the variables in logarithms). Producer price in°a-
tion was chosen because it is not a®ected by indirect tax increases. The consumer
price index for Germany is greatly distorted by indirect tax increases and one-o® ef-
fects of German uni¯cation, which would require the introduction of several dummy
variables in a VAR.
3Although this could imply that each model estimates a di®erent monetary policy
shock, a direct comparison shows that they are nearly identically estimated.Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 9
economic theory suggests furthermore that real interest rates are stationary.
The third cointegrating vector assumes that in the long run, money growth
(possibly money growth exceeding some constant rate) equals in°ation, which
imposes superneutrality of money.4 A cointegration rank of 3 seems plausible
a priori, and the test statistics can be read in this way. In the following, the
existence of 3 cointegration relations is therefore assumed, with the cointe-
grating vectors formulated as follows:
Dmt bci;t it ¼t
¯0
1 : 0 1 0 0
¯0
2 : 0 0 1 -1
¯0
3 : 1 0 0 -1
This hypothesis cannot be rejected in a corresponding test, as shown in
Table 8 in the appendix. With this speci¯cation of the cointegrating vectors,
the impulse response analysis of the system can now be performed. The mon-
etary policy shock will be identi¯ed within the transitory subsystem, because
after some time all variables should return to baseline (note that this already
implies an identi¯cation restriction).5 To identify the monetary policy shock
within this subsystem, it is assumed that it a®ects neither business conditions
nor in°ation within the same month.
The resulting impulse responses, presented with 90% error bands, are pro-
vided in Fig. 2 in the appendix. The monetary policy shock is found to be
a combination of a shock to the money growth rate and to interest rates: a
decrease in money growth plus an increase in interest rates constitute a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock. This shock decreases in°ation and business
conditions. All impulse responses are as expected a priori, which indicates that
the baseline model has succeeded in identifying monetary policy innovations.6
However, these models cannot estimate whether a monetary tightening might
have asymmetric impacts on ¯rms of di®erent size. An extended model is
therefore called for.
4This is derived and shown to be empirically relevant in Crowder (1997).
5Actually, the persistent shock is a nominal shock, too. It a®ects the nonsta-
tionary variables in the VAR, i.e. permanently alters the levels of in°ation, money
growth and/or interest rates. The interpretation of such a shock could be one of a
changing in°ation target of the Bundesbank. However, such a shock is di±cult to
reconcile with the actual pattern of the Bundesbank's monetary policy; I consider it
more reasonable to assume that the nonstationarity of the series is a matter of the
sample size rather than one of actual properties of the time series.
6The results throughout this paper are robust to a substitution of M3 with M2,
or the inclusion of exchange rates.10 Michael Ehrmann
4.2 Asymmetric E®ects of a Monetary Tightening Across Size
Classes
In order to test for possible asymmetries across size classes, the di®erence of
responses is included as an additional variable. To give an example, the busi-
ness conditions of the largest ¯rms are subtracted from those of the smallest
¯rms (¢15;t = bc1;t ¡ bc5;t). If both business conditions react in a parallel
way to interest rate shocks, no signi¯cant response of the additional variable
should be detectable. If relatively more small than large ¯rms answer that
their business conditions have deteriorated, ¢ij;t should become negative.
The extended VAR spans Xt = [¢ij;t Dmt ipt it ¼t]
0.7 ¢ij;t as the
di®erence of two stationary variables is by de¯nition itself stationary, which
implies a new cointegrating vector, namely the new variables themselves. As
before, the model is estimated several times, with ¢ij;t being substituted
and the other variables held constant. Ten di®erent combinations of ¢ij;t are
possible, all of which are in turn included in a VAR. The combinations are:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
bc4;t ¡ bc5;t bc3;t ¡ bc5;t bc2;t ¡ bc5;t bc1;t ¡ bc5;t
bc3;t ¡ bc4;t bc2;t ¡ bc4;t bc1;t ¡ bc4;t
bc2;t ¡ bc3;t bc1;t ¡ bc3;t
bc1;t ¡ bc2;t
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
The results of this exercise are reported in Fig. 2 in the appendix. A tight-
ening of monetary policy leads to distributional e®ects which are, however,
estimated only at low levels of signi¯cance. The business conditions of all size
classes worsen (see above), but those of smaller size classes deteriorate more
after approximately 18 months. The point estimates of responses of ¢ij;t are
then negative for every single measure. This implies that the business condi-
tions of smaller ¯rms take longer to return to baseline than those of larger
¯rms, which would mean that the transmission lags of the balance sheet and
bank lending channel are relatively long. This is not implausible, however,
since both channels operate through the banking system, which might add
further reaction and transmission lags.
Additionally, the impulse responses evolve monotonically across size classes.
Firms become more heterogeneous when moving from the left to the right in
the matrix of responses, as well as when moving up from the bottom. In both
directions, and for every single row and column, the point estimates of the
impulse responses become more pronounced step by step.
7Detrended industrial production, ipt, replaces the business conditions, bci;t,
used so far for two reasons: ¯rst, to have an identical output variable across models
and second, to avoid using the business conditions of a size class twice, in bci;t as
well as in ¢ij;t. The results go through with using a bci;t-variable instead, too.Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 11
5 Demand Side E®ects
The original hypothesis that small ¯rms are a®ected more strongly by mon-
etary policy shocks stems from capital market imperfection theories and as
such is concerned with ¯nancial factors. The evidence found in the preceding
section supports this hypothesis, but cannot reveal whether the asymmetry
indeed arises due to ¯nancial factors. If the business survey included questions
on the ¯nancial situation of ¯rms, the hypothesis could be tested directly. Un-
fortunately, this is not the case. The survey question on the current demand
situation of ¯rms can be helpful to single out other potential explanations,
however.
Potentially, both the supply side as well as the demand side situation of
¯rms should enter the evaluation of current business conditions. The business
conditions of size class i can thus be described as a weighted sum of the two
factors (possibly with some intercept ®i and some error term "i;t):
bci;t = ®i + !idemi;t + (1 ¡ !i)supi;t + "i;t
The constraints imposed by the data set are that supi;t is not observable
{ whereas demi;t is. Additionally, we do not know the weights !i. It is easy to
see, however, that regardless of the weighting, responses of bci;t to monetary
policy shocks that exceed those of the responses of demi;t must stem from
supply side factors (since 0 · !i · 1). I will make use of this property as
follows: the last model is extended to include the relative demand positions.
The impulse responses of relative business conditions and demand situations
are then compared: if the former are bigger than the latter, it can be concluded
that supply-side issues create asymmetry, too.
A model speci¯cation with a demand variable is useful for yet another
reason. The Ifo survey data have been criticized for a bias towards the de-
mand side. A survey conducted by the Ifo Institute in 1976 found that the
respondents often deal in their regular business with the ¯rm's sales, and thus
give a biased weight to demand factors. Financial factors, the focal point of
this paper, are therefore somewhat underrepresented. By including a demand
variable in the VAR, it is possible to check whether last section's ¯ndings are
robust. Once demand asymmetries across size classes have been accounted
for, any asymmetries on top of this make a strong case for supply-side and
probably ¯nancial factors.
To check whether the demand variable itself responds as expected to a
monetary policy shock, impulse responses are ¯rst calculated for the baseline
VAR Xt = [Dmt demi;t it ¼t]0. demi;t denotes demand and is varied
to cover all ¯ve size classes. The results of the cointegration analysis and
the tests of the restrictions on the cointegrating vectors can be found in the
appendix. A cointegration rank of r = 3 is maintained for all models, with
the cointegrating vectors being the demand variable, the real interest rate and
superneutrality of money (see Tables 9 and 10). Figure 4 plots the impulse12 Michael Ehrmann
responses of this baseline VAR. Following a contractionary monetary policy
shock, demand declines for ¯rms of all size classes, as expected.
In order to test for asymmetric e®ects, the relative demand situation is
included in the model of the preceding section. The VAR now comprises
Xt = [¢ij;Dt ¢ij;t Dmt ipt it ¼t]
0, where ¢ij;Dt denotes the relative
demand position of ¯rms, in contrast to ¢ij;t which represents the relative
business conditions of ¯rms. The model is again estimated for all ten possible
combinations of the delta-variables. The corresponding impulse responses can
be found in Figs. 5 and 6. The relative demand positions of ¯rms deteriorate
after a monetary policy tightening, which means that again there is a bias
which is unfavorable for small ¯rms, although this speci¯cation has not been
able to improve the signi¯cance of the ¯ndings. Again, each point estimate
becomes more pronounced moving up the columns or moving to the right in
the rows of Fig. 5.
How does the picture on the relative positions of ¯rms change with respect
to their business conditions? Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 6, it turns out that,
indeed, the responses of relative business conditions are indeed much stronger
than those of demand positions. Interestingly, the responses of relative busi-
ness conditions hardly change when the model is extended: Figs. 3 and 6 are
nearly identical. The conclusion from this exercise is that demand also reacts
more strongly for small ¯rms; however, demand tells only part of the story.
We are left with another cause of asymmetry that must stem from the supply
side.
6 Business Cycle Asymmetry
As stated in the introduction, theories of the credit channel maintain the
hypothesis that the distributional e®ects of monetary policy actions should
be more pronounced in business cycle downturns. In the following, I will test
for these e®ects, but two caveats should be mentioned beforehand.
Firstly, the data sample ranges from 1981:7 to 1998:12 and inspection of
Fig. 1 reveals that over this sample period the German economy went through
roughly 1.5 cycles. The evidence to be extracted from this small sample has
to be taken with caution.
Secondly, the German economy is often referred to as a bank-based system.
Small ¯rms in particular often have a close link to one bank, their \Hausbank".
Theory suggests that small ¯rms allow one single bank to gain such an in°uen-
tial position only because they expect advantages in other areas. For example,
one of the possible gains a small ¯rm might achieve in a close banking rela-
tionship is interest rate smoothing: a bank might be willing not to pass on a
monetary-policy-induced interest rate increase to a close customer. This e®ect
is probably strongest in times when the borrower would have di±culties with
rising interest rates, i.e., in periods of low growth. Relationship lending can
thus weaken the incidence of business cycle asymmetries to quite some extent.Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 13
6.1 Estimation Strategy: Regime-Dependent Impulse Responses in
a Markov-Switching Model
In order to test for such business-cycle-related asymmetries, I will calculate
regime-dependent impulse responses in a Markov-switching model.8 This es-
timation procedure consists of two stages.
In the ¯rst stage, an unrestricted VAR is estimated that allows for Markov-
switching regimes. Since the hypotheses to be tested are conditional on the
business cycle, it is essential that the Markov-switching regimes capture the
states of the business cycle. This ¯rst stage yields distinct parameter sets: one
describes the economy in a business cycle expansion; the other set is valid if
the economy is in a contractionary business cycle phase.
These two sets of parameters are then used in a second stage where struc-
ture is imposed by applying the usual identi¯cation restrictions, for each
regime separately, and impulse response analysis is performed. The result-
ing impulse responses are conditional on the state of the economy, and as
such disentangle the e®ects of monetary policy shocks for expansionary and
contractionary business cycle phases.
The Markov-switching model employed in the ¯rst stage was originally in-
troduced by Hamilton (1989) . To achieve distinctly shaped impulse responses
for the two regimes, it is necessary to extend his speci¯cation beyond a mere
mean-switching model. State-dependent autoregressive parameters will give
rise to di®erent shapes of the impulse responses, whereas a state-dependent
variance{covariance matrix will lead to distinct impact e®ects of the shocks.
Impulse responses conditional on the state of the economy are of course a
ceteris paribus experiment. The economy is in a given regime when the mone-
tary policy shock hits the system, and the e®ects traced by looking at impulse
responses assume that, throughout, the economy does not switch regimes.9
In this way it is possible to test the theoretical predictions, which themselves
are conditional: the transmission channels are claimed to be stronger during
downturns than during expansions.
Of course, the analysis is a pure thought experiment. Given a probability
of staying in one regime of, say, .95, the expected probability of still being in
the same regime some 48 months later is merely .09 { so one would not really
expect to stay in the same regime all the time for which the impulse responses
are actually being calculated. The impulse responses are nonetheless a useful
tool. As long as the economy stays in the same regime, they are valid { so
even if the full trajectory is not being realized, the periods up to the change
in regime are characterized by the conditional impulse responses.
8See Ehrmann et al. (2003) for a more detailed exposition of the estimation
strategy.
9This excludes any analysis of how e®ective a monetary policy shock can be in
moving the economy from one state to the other.14 Michael Ehrmann
6.2 Model Set-up
To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, the number of regimes cho-
sen is two. In addition, the number of variables in the VAR is reduced. It is
not feasible in this context to estimate large-dimensional systems as in the
preceding sections. The reduction is carried out in two steps. Firstly, it turns
out that a cointegrated VAR with Xt = [bci;t it ¼t]
0 with the KPSW iden-
ti¯cation scheme gives reasonable impulse responses, too: business conditions
deteriorate after a shock to the interest rate, and in°ation falls. The informa-
tional content has decreased of course, because now it is no longer possible to
identify the liquidity e®ects of monetary policy.
A second reduction is possible because in the very special case analyzed
here, where the variables of interest are stationary, the model speci¯cation can
be reduced from a full-blown VECM with KPSW's identi¯cation scheme to
a simple VAR with stationary variables only, where the identi¯cation scheme
follows a Choleski decomposition. The two models simulate the same shocks













where the monetary policy shock is a shock to the second cointegrating vector,
i.e., to the real interest rate. An equivalent shock can be modelled in a VAR
which includes bci;t and the real interest rate rt directly.
Both in KPSW with two cointegration relations and in the stationary
VAR, one identi¯cation restriction has to be imposed. The restriction that a
monetary policy shock cannot a®ect business conditions contemporaneously
is imposed in a VAR with a Choleski decomposition by ordering real interest
rates last.
The business conditions of ¯rms de¯ne the business cycle; if they fall,
the economy is in a contraction; if they rise, the business cycle position is
expansionary. This implies that models for the di®erent size classes would
de¯ne a di®erent business cycle. To ensure some stability, each model therefore
includes the business conditions of the largest ¯rms and additionally those of




































where "t v iid N(0;§). The state transition probabilities are assumed to
follow a ¯rst-order Markov chain:
pij = Pr(st+1 = jjst = i);
2 X
j=1
pij = 1 8i;j 2 f1;2g (2)Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 15
Some restrictions are imposed to decrease the number of switching param-
eters: none of the autoregressive parameters in the interest rate equation is
switching, and the variance{covariance matrix is not state-dependent.
6.3 Empirical Results
In such a set-up, it is a priori not sure whether the regimes picked by the
algorithm are actually related to the business cycle. Any kind of regime that
shows best ¯t, be it characterized by distinct intercepts, autoregressive pa-
rameters, or some combination, can emerge. Nonetheless, the regimes picked
can indeed be characterized as business cycle downturns and expansions. To
take an example, in the model with bc2;t and bc5;t the estimated mean for bc5;t
is ¡:23 in regime one, and :09 in regime two (¡:21 and :04 for bc2;t). Figure
7 in the appendix reports the according regime probabilities and compares
them with the business conditions variable bc5;t. The ¯t of regimes to expan-
sions and contractions is relatively close: regime 1 spans from peaks to troughs
and therefore indicates a business cycle contraction, whilst regime 2 is well
characterized as an economic expansion. The characterization of business cy-
cle regimes is very close to those found in other, univariate Markov-switching







Two lags prove to be su±cient to achieve a well-speci¯ed VAR. This shows
that the ¯t of the models is much better in a Markov-switching framework
than when neglecting it; in the standard VAR models, a lag length of six
was needed. The results of mis-speci¯cation tests following Hamilton (1996)
can be found in the appendix. The restrictions imposed on the autoregressive
parameters of the interest rate equation are accepted with a p-level of 0.65.
In the second stage of the procedure, structure is given to the unrestricted
MS-VAR. Figure 8 graphs the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
conditional on the state of the economy. In both regimes, a tightening of mon-
etary policy leads to a deterioration of business conditions for ¯rms of all size
classes. Not unexpectedly, the impulse response functions are estimated rather
imprecisely. This is especially the case for regime 1, which is estimated on very
few observations. When interpreting the point estimates, however, it is inter-
esting to compare the responses for a given size class across the two regimes.
For some size classes, there does not seem to be any di®erence, whereas ¯rms
of size class one face a stronger deterioration of business conditions when the
economy is in a downturn. The magnitude of the maximum e®ects more than
doubles: from ¡3:5 to ¡7:7. A direct comparison across size classes is provided
in the Table 5, which calculates the ampli¯cation of responses in contractions
relative to expansions (in the example of size class one: ¡7:7
¡3:5 = 2:2). As pre-
dicted by theory, the e®ect of an interest rate shock on business conditions of16 Michael Ehrmann
the smallest ¯rms is stronger in a downturn than in an expansion, although
this ¯nding is subject to a caveat regarding its statistical signi¯cance.
Table 5. Ampli¯cation of Responses in Business Cycle Downturns
Size Class 1 2 3 4 5
Ampli¯cation Factor 2.2 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.0
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided empirical tests for hypotheses formulated in capital
market imperfection theories, claiming a higher exposure of small ¯rms to
monetary policy tightenings when compared to large ¯rms. The data set ana-
lyzed consists of ¯rms' aggregated answers from a business survey. The data is
sorted into size classes, ranging from ¯rms with 1{49 employees to ¯rms with
more than 1,000 employees. Thus, a sample bias towards large ¯rms which
is present in many data sets is avoided. The business survey is conducted
on a monthly basis, which allows for an analysis at a much higher frequency
than the usual data sets on small ¯rms (mostly annual balance sheet data or
quarterly ¯nancial reports). The downside of the data set is possible ambigu-
ities, because the survey questions concern non-quanti¯able items such as the
general assessment of business conditions. It has been shown, however, that
the series possess good leading indicator qualities and correlate closely with
the business cycle components of industrial production. Therefore, the data
quality can be considered as adequate for research on macroeconomic issues.
The empirical results support theories of asymmetric monetary policy ef-
fects. The business conditions of all ¯rms deteriorate after a monetary tight-
ening, but those of small ¯rms do so relatively more. As a consequence, small
¯rms are hit disproportionately strongly by interest rate increases; this shift in
their relative position causes distributional e®ects of monetary policy in that
the burden of adjustments is unevenly shared between ¯rms of di®erent size.
Although at modest levels of signi¯cance, it has furthermore been shown that
these asymmetries are augmented in business cycle downturns. Compared to
expansions, the distributional e®ects are more pronounced.
An analysis of demand-side factors has been performed in order to distin-
guish supply-side from demand-side e®ects. After accounting for di®erences in
the relative demand situations of small vs. large ¯rms, there are still distribu-
tional e®ects of monetary policy detectable. Demand-side factors can thus tell
only part of the story, with the bulk being left for supply-side factors. Even
though it was not possible to test the importance of ¯nancial issues with the
available data, this is the main criterion that comes to mind when thinking
about uneven e®ects of interest rate changes. The empirical ¯ndings of thisFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 17
paper therefore support theories which predict asymmetric e®ects of mone-
tary policy and cannot reject theories that attribute such e®ects to ¯nancial
factors.
A Appendix
A.1 Transformation of Business Survey Data for the Empirical
Analysis
The transformation applied to the business survey data series is based on the
assumption that the data follows a logistic model. Most of the time, it can be
expected that the variables cluster around medium values in the range, say, of
[¡:5;:5]. Only if the macroeconomic conditions become very (un-)favourable
can it be expected that the series come close to their extreme values of §1.
In order to make 100% of all ¯rms answer that times are worse/better, the
conditions must be very severe, especially because the data are not disaggre-
gated according to industry. Indeed, the actual range of the series is far from
hitting the borderline cases. This means, however, that the trajectories of the






t¯+"t ¡ 1; (3)
where the xt are the usual explanatory variables of a regression model. The
multiplication by factor 2 and the subtraction of 1 ensure that the data actu-
ally lie in the range [¡1;1] (for x0
t¯ + "t ! 1; yt ! 1; for x0
t¯ + "t ! ¡1;







Let at = ex
0
t¯+"t. Thus (3) simpli¯es to
yt = 2at
1+at ¡ 1
yt + ytat = 2at ¡ 1 ¡ at



















t¯ + "t (4)
A.2 The KPSW-Approach to Identi¯cation in Structural Vector
Autoregressions
Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) go back to the seminal article by
Sims (1980). They assume that the economy can be described by a dynamic,
stochastic, linear model of the form:
A0Xt = A1Xt¡1 + ::: + AkXt¡k + ¹t = A(L)Xt¡1 + ¹t (5)
with ¹t s iid N(0;§¹), where Xt represents an nx1-vector of endogenous
variables, including one or several instrument variables, and L denotes the lag
operator. The estimation proceeds with the reduced form
Xt = C1Xt¡1 + ::: + CkXt¡k + "t = C(L)Xt¡1 + "t (6)
with Ci = A
¡1
0 Ai and "t = A
¡1
0 ¹t. Estimates can be found for the coe±cient
matrices Ci and the variance{covariance matrix of the disturbances "t, §".
However, of interest are the parameters in the matrices Ai and §¹, which are
exactly identi¯ed if n2 parameters are restricted. A ¯rst set of restrictions is
found by the assumption of uncorrelated structural errors (i.e., §¹ diagonal)
and by normalising the diagonal elements to unity, yielding §¹ = E(¹t¹
0
t) =
In, which imposes n(n+1)=2 restrictions. Hence, further n(n¡1)=2 restrictions
are needed. Sims (1980) used a recursive structure to achieve identi¯cation,
whereas subsequent contributions extended the range of identi¯cation schemes
by restricting parameters in various matrices of the system. Amongst these are
King, Plosser, Stock, and Watson (1991). They have shown that cointegration
properties of the data can be used for identi¯cation purposes. A cointegrated
VAR model, which is in its Vector Error Correction format (See Johansen
(1995), pp. 45{49):
¢Xt = ®¯0Xt¡1 +
k¡1 X
i=1
¡i¢Xt¡i + "t (7)Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 19




"i + C¤(L)"t + A (8)





¡ = I ¡
Pk¡1
i=1 ¡i. Equation (8) shows that the representation in levels is





the stationary part of C¤(L)"t.
The idea behind KPSW is to decompose the shocks " into r shocks that
have only transitory e®ects (on the levels of the variables), and n ¡ r shocks
with permanent e®ects (with r denoting the number of cointegration rela-
tions). This is achieved by rotating the system by premultiplying certain ma-







The matrix S has to satisfy SC 6= 0. It follows that the new set of variables
consists of n ¡ r non-stationary and r stationary variables. The stationary
variables are identical to the cointegrating vectors; their stationarity follows








"i + ¯0C¤(L)"t + ¯0A = ¯0C¤(L)"t: (10)
This system need not be identi¯ed fully; partial identi¯cation of either
the transitory or the persistent shocks is also possible. This amounts to the
imposition of r(n ¡ r) identi¯cation restrictions by setting the according co-
variances of the shocks to zero. These restrictions have been tested for by the
test for the cointegrating rank. Instead, however, a di®erent kind of identi¯-
cation restriction is needed, namely a decision as to which part of the system
the supposed shock is to be found (like in the context of the present paper,
where the monetary policy shock is identi¯ed in the transitory subsystem).
This restriction cannot be tested and has to be justi¯ed by economic theory.
To identify the subsystems, additional untested identi¯cation restrictions
are necessary. If only the shocks with permanent e®ects are of interest, then
(n ¡ r)(n ¡ r ¡ 1)=2 additional identi¯cation restrictions are needed. In par-
ticular, where there are r = n ¡ 1 cointegration relations, no additional iden-
ti¯cation restrictions have to be imposed. Should the shocks of interest be the
transitory ones, then r(r ¡ 1)=2 additional restrictions are su±cient.20 Michael Ehrmann
A.3 Test Statistics
Table 6. Cross-Correlation of Business Conditions with Industrial Pro-
duction, Quarterly Bandpass-Filtered Variables
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
bc1 -.69 -.66 -.52 -.26 .08 .42 .67 .78 .74 .60 .43 .27 .15
bc2 -.46 -.30 -.08 .20 .48 .70 .83 .85 .76 .61 .43 .24 .08
bc3 -.51 -.36 -.13 .15 .44 .68 .82 .85 .78 .64 .47 .30 .16
bc4 -.56 -.42 -.19 .10 .41 .67 .82 .85 .78 .64 .47 .30 .14
bc5 -.58 -.45 -.22 .08 .40 .67 .83 .85 .76 .61 .43 .26 .11
For lag k, the correlations are de¯ned between outputt and business conditionst¡k.
Hence, a positive k indicates the lead of a variable with respect to the business
cycle. The variables are: business conditions for ¯rms of size class 1 (bc1) to 5
(bc5), where 1=smallest, 5=largest.
Table 7. Trace Statistics for the Test of Cointegration Rank of the Base-
line Model
Model bc1;t bc2;t bc3;t bc4;t bc5;t
r = 0a 92.14 90.61 97.30 94.73 99.08
r = 1b 50.87 48.08 51.12 49.84 56.60
r = 2c 21.70 20.66 24.72 23.07 27.22
r = 3d 4.37* 4.83* 5.70* 7.30* 6.19*
a critical values 95%: 53.42; b 34.80; c 19.99; d 9.13
Table 8. Test for Three Cointegrating Vectors in the Baseline Model:
bci;t, Real Interest Rates and Superneutrality of Money
Model bc1;t bc2;t bc3;t bc4;t bc5;t
Â2(3) 6.80 5.81 4.52 3.49 5.83
p-value 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.12Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 21
Business Conditions







Fig. 1. Business Conditions of Firms of Size Class 1 (Smallest) and 5
(Largest)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Money Growth

















































Response of Relative Business Conditions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
4 vs. 5



























































Fig. 3. Responses of the Relative Business Conditions of Firms (¢ij;t) to
a Contractionary Monetary Policy ShockFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 23
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on Demand
Money Growth

















































Fig. 4. Responses of Demand to a Monetary Policy Shock24 Michael Ehrmann
Response of Relative Demand Positions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
4 vs. 5





































































Fig. 5. Responses of the Relative Demand Positions of Firms (¢ij;Dt) to
a Contractionary Monetary Policy ShockFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 25
Response of Relative Business Conditions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
4 vs. 5



























































Fig. 6. Responses of the Relative Business Conditions of Firms (¢ij;t) to
a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock in a Model with Demand26 Michael Ehrmann
Estimated Regimes
Smoothed Probability of being in Regime 1
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Fig. 7. Regime Probabilities for the Markov-Switching VAR with Busi-
ness ConditionsFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 27
Table 9. Trace Statistics for the Test of Cointegration Rank of the Base-
line Model with Demand Variables
Model dem1;t dem2;t dem3;t dem4;t dem5;t
r = 0a 87.18 85.89 93.72 89.81 85.40
r = 1b 45.87 42.28 50.30 47.03 43.72
r = 2c 22.04 21.91 23.39 22.23 22.57
r = 3d 4.09* 4.56* 6.69* 5.93* 5.97*
a critical values 95%: 53.42; b 34.80; c 19.99; d 9.13
Table 10. Test for Three Cointegrating Vectors in the Baseline Model
with Demand Variables: Demand, Real Interest Rates and Superneutral-
ity of Money
Model dem1;t dem2;t dem3;t dem4;t dem5;t
Â2(3) 8.48 7.01 6.05 6.45 6.13
p-value 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11
Table 11. Mis-Speci¯cation Tests for the MS-VAR Model on Business
Conditions: bc2;t;bc5;t;rt
Autocorrelation ARCH Markov chain
Equation 1 1.20 (0.31) 0.02 (0.89) 1.41 (0.23)
Equation 2 2.09 (0.08) 3.22 (0.07) 0.03 (1.00)
Equation 3 0.37 (0.83) 1.50 (0.22) 3.03 (0.02)*
System 1.03 (0.42) 1.32 (0.12) 2.01 (0.05)
Tests are for omitted autocorrelation, omitted ARCH and mis-speci¯cation of the
Markovian dynamics. Numbers in brackets are p-values.28 Michael Ehrmann
Business Conditions, State-Dependent Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
SC 1, s=1









































































Fig. 8. State-Dependent Responses to a Monetary Policy ShockFirm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission 29
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